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Abstract 
Alongside the neo-institutional model of networked relations among universities, 
industries, and governments, the Triple Helix can be provided with a neo-evolutionary 
interpretation as three selection environments operating upon one another: markets, 
organizations, and technological opportunities. How are technological innovation 
systems different from national ones? The three selection environments fulfill social 
functions: wealth creation, organization control, and organized knowledge production. 
The main carriers of this system—industry, government, and academia—provide the 
variation both recursively and by interacting among them under the pressure of 
competition. Empirical case studies enable us to understand how these evolutionary 
mechanisms can be expected to operate in historical instance. The model is needed for 
distinguishing, for example, between trajectories and regimes.  
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Introduction 
Far from being a program running parallel to or competing with the national innovation 
system (NIS), the Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations was 
introduced to bring out the depth and complexity of the innovation process as a recursive 
interaction system underlying the knowledge-based economy, and thus to enhance the 
exploration and exploitation of this knowledge base on conceptual and empirical grounds 
(Abramowitz & David, 1996; David & Foray, 1995 and 2002). While NIS is ultimately 
an institutional program focused on wealth creation at the national—or mutatis mutandis, 
regional—level, Triple Helix provides a model of the structure and dynamics underlying 
the innovation system functioning at various levels. Unlike NIS (or RIS), the Triple Helix 
model does not presume a geographically delineated system, but it provides a framework 
for investigating empirical questions at a level of “systemness,” defined  in terms of 
regimes and trajectories. Are innovation systems aligned at the level of nations, sectors, 
regions, etc., and if so, to which extent? Can the variation be explained in terms of 
underlying structures—that is, selection environments—and their recursive interactions? 
 
This special issue covers contributions selected from the proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference on the Triple Helix that was hosted by the University of 
Strathclyde in Glasgow in June 2009. The Conference theme on Triple Helix as a 
framework for addressing the global agenda of innovation, competitiveness, and 
sustainable development raises questions, inter alia, about the theoretical adequacy and 
empirical validity of Triple Helix as a policy model. How can the Triple Helix model be 
extended beyond the trilateral relationship between university, industry and government 
to explain the complex features of the dynamics in the innovation system? In what ways 
has the introduction of the Triple Helix concept (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1995, 2000) 
added to the ongoing efforts of explaining innovation as a systemic phenomenon?  
 
A network analysis cannot inform us about the dynamics, but only about evolving 
institutional relations. In our opinion, it is rather the “forces of motion” underlying the 
institutional linkages—namely the way knowledge infrastructures evolve and can have 
implications for technological opportunities; and the way the political economy evolves 
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to determine the institutional mechanisms for the selection of technological trajectories—
that bear out Triple Helix as a dynamic system of three selection mechanisms operating 
upon one another. These selection mechanisms—markets, organizations, and 
technological opportunities—change characteristically over time as do the cultural and 
behavioural patterns of the actors engaged in the interactions involving the process of 
knowledge generation and knowledge sharing and exchange at the level of each system. 
The Triple Helix perspective enables us to study innovation systems in empirical terms 
(to which extent can which arrangement be considered as a system?) and analyze best 
practice trends (are more knowledge-based arrangements possible?).  
 
The evolution of systems thinking in innovation theory 
How can the Triple Helix concept be related to the programme of studying “national 
innovation systems”? How are the concepts of innovation systems in these two research 
programmes different and yet related? Lundvall (1988) first introduced the concept of 
“national systems of innovation” by elaborating on Christopher Freeman’s (1987) study 
entitled “Technology, policy, and economic performance: lessons from Japan,” in which 
the latter had argued that Western nations could learn from Japan’s experience in the 
coordination, at the national level, of S&T policies orchestrated by the Japanese Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (MITI) in the preceding decades. Yamauchi (1986) characterized 
the Japanese experience as a textbook-model: partners in the Japanese system knew what 
was expected technologically in order to meet (economic) demands and (political) 
objectives. In this integrative model, university-industry-government relations were 
synchronized ex ante, however impicitly, at the national level.  
 
In Western countries, this ex ante synchronization at the national level had been lost 
because of an ongoing internationalization during the post-War priod. Internationalization 
of the American corporations during the 1950s was followed by a wave of mergers 
among European companies during the 1960s. Knowledge-intensive industries were 
particularly prone to internationalization. The “Sputnik shock” of 1957 had made policy 
makers aware that S&T policies needed international coordination (York, 1970). The 
OECD, which was originally initiated for the distribution of Marshall aid after WW II, 
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was transformed into a civil center of coordination—alongside NATO—among national 
S&T policies.  
 
Most Western European countries developed S&T policies during the 1960s. The global 
oil-crises of the 1970s enhanced the tendency towards the internationalization of S&T 
policies. In the 1980s, the EU increasingly began to play a role in innovation policies on 
the initiative of European presidents such as Jacques Delors, who favored unification on 
the basis of the cultural heritage of Europe in terms of S&T, both for ideological and 
economic reasons. 
 
Evolutionary theorizing about innovation emerged alongside these policy initiatives 
during the late 1970s. Nelson & Winter’s article entitled “In search of a useful theory of 
innovation” (1977) can be considered seminal to the shaping of evolutionary economics 
(cf. Nelson & Winter, 1982). The theoretical model was soon followed by Pavitt’s (1984) 
empirical studies on innovation patterns using innovation statistics and Freeman’s (1982) 
contributions at the level of the OECD. With the exception of Sahal (1981, 1985), 
however, these scholars tended to avoid invoking “systems theory,” apparently because 
of the non-empirical—one might even say anti-empirical—inclinations dominant in this 
research tradition. Although innovation was considered to be systemic, the focus on 
empirical studies and, therefore, the need for developing measurable indicators was 
considered a primary objective. Andersen (1994) noted that even the question of “what is 
evolving” was not yet properly answered by Nelson and Winter (1982). The focus 
remained on entrepreneurship; and the dominant theory accordingly became a theory of 
the firm as the carrier of the innovation process (Casson, 1997). 
 
When Lundvall (1988) proposed that the nation be considered as the first candidate for 
the study of innovation systems, he formulated this claim carefully in terms of a 
heuristics: 
The interdependency between production and innovation goes both ways. […] This 
interdependency between production and innovation makes it legitimate to take the 
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national system of production as a starting point when defining a system of innovation 
(Lundvall, 1988, p. 362). 
 
The idea of integrating innovation into production at the national level has the advantage 
of providing the analyst with an institutionally demarcated system of reference. If the 
market is continuously upset by innovation, can the nation then perhaps be considered as 
another, albeit institutionally organized (quasi-)equilibrium (Aoki, 2001)? Lundvall, 
furthermore, proposed to consider the interactions between two selection mechanisms in 
user-producer relations (market dynamics and transaction costs) as a different micro-
economic foundation of theorizing (instead of the conventional agent-based economic 
profit maximization). 
 
The specification of the nation as a well-defined system of reference enables evolutionary 
economists to study at the macro level, for example, the so-called “differential 
productivity growth puzzle” which is generated by the different speeds of development 
among the various industrial sectors (Nelson and Winter, 1975). The problem of the 
relative rates of innovation cannot be defined properly without the specification of a 
system of reference that integrates different sectors of an economy (Nelson, 1982, 1994). 
The solutions to this “puzzle” of differentiation can accordingly be expected to differ 
among nation-states (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
 
In search of a definition of innovation systems  
Although the emergence of transnational levels of government, like in the European 
Union, together with an increased awareness of regional differences within and across 
nations, have changed the functions of national governments (Braczyk et al., 1998), 
integration at the national level continues to play a major role in systems of innovation 
(Skolnikoff, 1993). The historical progression towards internationalization varies across 
countries.  
 
For example, after its opening to the “market system” in the early 1990s, China further 
developed its policies deliberately in terms of a national system of innovations, while the 
European Commission became disenchanted with this concept increasingly in the early 
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90s: a “knowledge-based economy” develops at the supra-national level. Reducing the 
concepts to the geographical level of nations or regions may, therefore, fail to address the 
new (knowledge-based) dynamics which tends to transcend geographical boundaries.  
 
In a workshop on the subject of the knowledge-based economy in 1994, Abramowitz and 
David (1996: 35) suggested that codified knowledge should be made central to the 
analysis of the modern economy, and formulated as follows:  
Perhaps this single most salient characteristic of recent economic growth has been the 
secularly rising reliance upon codified knowledge as a basis for the organization and 
conduct of economic activities, including among the latter the purposive extension of the 
economically relevant knowledge base. While tacit knowledge continues to play critical 
roles, affecting individual and organizational competencies and the localization of 
scientific and technological advances, codification has been both the motive force and the 
favoured form taken by the expansion of the knowledge base. 
 
Analytically, this focus on codified knowledge demarcated the new research programme 
of innovation systems from the older concept of a “knowledge economy” with its focus 
on knowledge workers and hence embodied knowledge (Cooke, 2002; Machlup, 1962; 
Penrose, 1959). Embodied and tacit knowledge is embedded in contexts (Bowker, 2005; 
Collins, 1974; Polanyi, 1961; Zuboff, 1988), while codified knowledge can be 
decontextualized, and therefore, among other things, traded on a market (Dasgupta & 
David, 1984). The metaphor of a knowledge-based economy appreciates the increased 
importance of organized R&D in shaping systems of innovation. The knowledge 
production function has become a structural characteristic—and, therefore, a relevant 
selection environment—of the modern economy (Schumpeter, 1939, 1943).  
 
Whereas a knowledge-based economy develops as a dynamic system at the global level, 
thus transcending national or geographical boundaries, wealth from knowledge has to be 
retained locally. National and regional systems of innovation can thus be considered as 
retention mechanisms of a self-organizing system that develops at the global level. 
Government policies hence can no longer be efficient when developed exclusively in 
terms of economic parameters; the economic environment is no longer the only relevant 
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one. Technological opportunities provide an additional selection environment. For 
example, as Barack Obama formulated in one of his campaign speeches:  
“[T]his long-term agenda […] will require us first and foremost to train and educate our 
workforce with the skills necessary to compete in a knowledge-based economy. We’ll also need 
to place a greater emphasis on areas like science and technology that will define the workforce of 
the 21st century, and invest in the research and innovation necessary to create the jobs and 
industries of the future right here in America.”3 
 
 
At the micro-level one is well aware of this trade-off between different selection 
mechanisms when one uses price/performance relations instead of the price criterion 
when buying technological devices such as personal computers: one should not buy the 
cheapest ones! A relevant question for government policies, however, follows: can 
wealth be retained in geographical systems, or are national systems of regulation and 
legislation mainly redistributors of wealth which is generated in other systems? Should a 
region such as Piedmont, for example, be considered as the frame of reference because it 
was administratively so defined as a region (OECD, 2009) or should one optimize 
possible synergies across regional borders between, for example, Piedmont and 
Lombardy? Previously taken-for-granted systems of reference are no longer given, but 
can be reconsidered in the light of technological opportunities, patent portfolios, 
knowledge infrastructures, etc. 
 
Upon studying the emergence of biotechnology during the 1980s, Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz (1991) proposed that technologies shape their own innovation systems as 
contexts (“selection environments”) needed for the further development of technological 
innovations as a system. How are technological innovation systems different from 
national ones? The question of whether systems of innovation are technologically or 
geographically integrated is pertinent because the structures of a system determine the 
causalities prevailing in it. Are governments able to “steer” technological developments? 
Can government incentives be considered as independent variables or are they mainly 
                                                 
3 Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: “Change That Works for You,” June 9, 2008, at 
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/06/09/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_76.php . 
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feedback on systems which are driven by other potentially non-linear dynamics? Thus, 
the question of technological determinism can be reformulated as an empirical one: to 
what extent do various agents and mechanisms control the ongoing developments? 
 
The dynamics of an innovation system are non-linear because they are based on 
interactions between (economic) demand, (political) objectives, and (technological) 
opportunities, and also because of path-dependencies in all systems of reference.  
National patterns (strengths and weaknesses, natural endowments, etc.), for example, 
shaped systems at national levels between approximately 1870 and 1970. Thus, while car 
manufacturing is important in Germany’s industrial structure, it hardly plays a role in a 
neighbouring country such as the Netherlands with its service-oriented economy.  
 
What determines a system? A system results from the ways in which selection 
mechanisms operate given the wide range of possibilities arising from the Schumpeterian 
phenomenon of “creative destruction.” In a knowledge-based economy, three selection 
mechanisms are continuously recombined, generating successive levels of innovation and 
technological trajectories: the economic mechanism of the market; the political 
mechanism of control over resources; and the mechanism for the generation of new 
knowledge as potentially innovative.  
Selection (unlike variation) is a deterministic operation. Variation can be more or less 
random. Selection exhibits an instance of the selection mechanism operating upon the 
variation because of a (hypothesized since latent) structure in a system operating. Over 
time, recursive selections can shape technological trajectories (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Technological trajectories can be considered as the operations of selections upon 
previous selections; some selections can then be stabilized along a trajectory. Some 
stabilizations of trajectories along specific pathways can further be selected for 
globalization into a technological regime.  
 
Thus, three evolutionary mechanisms can be specified along the time axis: selection 
(mechanism of the market); stabilization (mechanism of control and regulation); and 
globalization (mechanism of knowledge generation and exchange). These selection 
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mechanisms operate upon the variations in different dimensions from the perspective of 
hindsight: given a variation, selection can operate. The resulting system is constructed 
bottom-up, but control operates increasingly top-down as a system is further shaped.  
 
For example, the national systems as they emerged in Europe, the USA, and Japan in the 
second half of the 19th century,4 stabilized the workings of markets within national 
systems by border controls, legislation and regulation, national systems of intellectual 
property protection, etc. Two selection mechanisms—markets and national politics—
could shape national systems or, in other words, political economies. At the global level, 
these national systems developed along trajectories which allowed for competition, for 
example, as colonial powers. This system of nations, however, was thoroughly upset by 
the competition among global regimes (communism, liberal democracy, and fascism) 
during WW II and the Cold War thereafter.  
 
The fading away of these conflicts set a third mechanism—organized knowledge 
production and control—free as a globalizing coordination mechanism and relevant 
selection environment, that is, as a structural component no longer to be considered as 
exogenous. Along each two of these selection mechanisms, trajectories can be formed. 
However, the operation of the third mechanism may continuously disturb a co-evolution 
between the other two. Let us specify the possible co-evolutions or mutual shapings 
between two of the three functions: knowledge exploration, knowledge exploitation, and 
organizational control. A knowledge-based economy can be considered as based on 
interactions between the two (traditional) drivers of a political economy with the new 
dynamics of knowledge production, diffusion, and control (Lengyel & Leydesdorff, 
2010). There are three major aspects to these interactions. 
 
First, there is the synergy between economic knowledge exploitation and organizational 
control at, for example, the national level or any other geographically delineated systems 
level (e.g., a region) that can be expected to contain a political economy. Second, a 
                                                 
4 The unification of Germany and Italy in 1870 completed a system of nation states which had been shaped 
in the period before, for example, during the American civil war (1860-1865) and the Meji restoration in 
Japan (1863).  
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synergy between (economic) knowledge exploitation and knowledge exploration may 
shape a technological (!) trajectory. Since the latter may evolve across national 
boundaries, transnational corporations, for example, can serve as the carriers. Third, a co-
evolution between knowledge exploration and organizational control can lock an 
innovation system into a national system of procurement like in the case of medical 
technologies or (traditional) energy systems. The former Soviet-Union provided an 
example par excellence in which the mechanism of the market was relatively lamed, 
whereupon the state apparatus emerged between (academic) knowledge exploration and 
knowledge exploitation within strictly defined and maintained geographical boundaries. 
 
The shaping of the regime of a knowledge-based economy assumes that the three 
selection mechanisms can operate upon one another. The imposition of boundaries by 
governance can be appreciated as functional specifically to the retention of wealth from 
knowledge. However, the system operates in such a way that selection mechanisms are 
no longer institutionally secured (like in a nation state, a firm or a discipline), but are 
evolutionarily defined in terms of functions: markets operate pervasively, control 
mechanisms are in place and further developing, and knowledge exploration is socially 
organized.  
 
In other words, the knowledge-based system tolerates the complexity of potentially 
divergent and differently rationalized developments. The differences in the rationalities 
can be considered functional to the further development of the system, but since the 
knowledge-based system is relatively globalized, it can be expected to remain in flux and 
can no longer be coordinated ex ante. Stabilization of this globalizing system (e.g., into a 
national system of innovations) presumes the choice of an analytical perspective and 
therefore mitigation of the prevailing complexity. Such a choice can analytically be 
heuristic, enabling us to raise empirical questions. However, both the perspectives and 
the subjects under study contain uncertainty, so that the selection environments are no 
longer to be considered as given, but as hypotheses which enable us to guide the analysis 
in a discourse.  
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Political discourse differs from scientific discourse, while economic exchanges are 
guided by price incentives. The three coordination mechanisms stand analytically 
orthogonal, but in innovative practices they interact. These interactions can be considered 
as instantiations which empirically condition and enable further developments in all three 
dimensions, but asymmetrically and asynchronously. In other words, a system of 
innovations can only be specified as a model which integrates discursive models at 
interfaces; these systems are not hardwired; the reality of such a system remains 
analytical. “What we see, is not what we get” and depends also on one’s perspective. 
Each perspective allows for an additional set of possibilities and can therefore inform the 
others; much as in the above example of price/performance as a criterion superior to the 
price mechanism in the case of knowledge-intensive devices (but not necessarily when 
buying oranges). Analogously, political discourse faces the huge task to reflexively 
understand its own priority in relation to ongoing interactions with both economic 
restructuring and scientific uncertainty. Appreciation of alternative options in the other 
dimensions, however, opens also the self-reference in each system to innovation.  
 
For example, in a recent study of the Hungarian system of innovations, it was found that 
the assumption of national integration was no longer fruitful for explaining the 
differences among regions (Lengyel and Leydesdorff, 2010). Unlike the Netherlands 
(Leydesdorff et al., 2006), the national level in this country no longer added to the 
“systemness” of innovations in three sub-national systems: the metropolitan system 
around Budapest, the western part of the country which has increasingly been integrated 
into Western-European and international systems of innovation, and the eastern part of 
the country which is largely integrated according to the old (politically controlled) model 
which predated the transition of the 1990s. The assumption of “systemness” of 
innovation can thus be considered as an hypothesis.  
 
“Systemness” assumes that synergy is generated in the relations among subsystems. Like 
the systems, the subsystems should not be reified. Subsystems are functional insofar as 
they serve the reproduction of the system; functions in composed systems can be 
specified as subdynamics. Three subdynamics are suggested by the Triple Helix model as 
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crucial: the economic dynamics of the market, the political dynamics of control, and the 
socio-cognitive dynamics in the production of organized knowledge. Whitley (1984), for 
example, specified “organized knowledge production and control systems” as 
disciplinary combinations of the latter two dynamics in a knowledge infrastructure. 
Schumpeter (1939, 1942) specified the combination of knowledge production and market 
dynamics as “creative destruction,” which provides the basis for changes in technological 
trajectories. The relations between political and economic dynamics have been the focus 
of theorizing about political economies in both Marxist and non-Marxist traditions. 
 
How do political economies change under the pressure of technological trajectories? How 
are technological trajectories upset when new technological regimes emerge? Path 
dependencies in the evolving systems of innovation are induced by the asynchronicities 
among the three coordination mechanisms. Two of the three mechanisms may at any time 
click into a co-evolution and then mutually shape a trajectory. The third mechanism can 
be expected to provide the dynamics. A lock-in, for example, between a technology and 
the market can be hyper-stabilized or gradually destabilized by this third dynamic 
depending of the prevailing sign of the feedback or feedforward (Dolfsma & 
Leydesdorff, 2009), 
 
Freeman and Perez (1988) developed a model of structural adjustment policies in which 
cycles are induced periodically by new key factors of the economy. However, this model 
remained a dialectical model of the development of the political economy under the 
pressure of otherwise exogenously defined technological developments induced by 
rapidly falling prices in factor inputs. The production of these new resources at the supra-
institutional level by organized knowledge production and control was not yet 
deconstructed and incorporated into the model.  
 
When the model allows for interaction among the three subdynamics of the system—with 
one of these subdynamics considered as an exogenous variable conditioning the 
coevolution between the other two—a Triple Helix model with three-way interactions 
can be hypothesized. The new model (based on a neo-evolutionary interpretation of the 
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Triple Helix in terms of interacting functions) enables us not only to envisage trajectory 
changes in the downswing phases of the economy, that is, at the end of cycles, but also 
the induction of regime changes in the technological environment, giving rise to the 
development of innovative products and processes of strategic significance, as in the case 
of renewable energy systems.  
 
While carbon-based energy production and consumption has become increasingly a 
burden to the current production system and its natural environment, one can envisage the 
increasingly rapid replacement of carbon-based energy-carriers with energy sources 
which are virtually unlimited such as solar or geothermic energy. Nevertheless, the 
introduction of these new energy sources requires adaptation of existing markets and 
political control structures which may take decades to emerge. Thus, the knowledge-
based economy system is both extremely buffered and flexible: new developments 
continuously emerge, but remain under heavy selection pressures. Old regimes do not 
give way without first attempting to encapsulate hyperselectively new developments by 
further differentiation (Bruckner et al., 1994). The more entrenched a system is, the more 
resilient it can be expected to be against regime change.  
 
For example, Douglas introduced the DC3 as a new paradigm for propeller aircrafts in 
1936. It took Boeing, its main competitor, only two years to shape a competitive aircraft 
(the 1938-Boeing 307 “Stratoliner”).  When the next model DC4 (1942) set the standards 
of the new regime (with four propellers), Boeing disinvested in its existing development 
capacities and produced the 1944-Boeing 377 “Stratocruiser” in accordance with the 
specifications of the new paradigm, such as a steel-based closed-body aircraft (Frenken & 
Leydesdorff, 2000, p. 340).  
 
When in a later phase of the development of civil aircraft, Boeing introduced the jet-
engine based wide body aircraft (707) in 1957, Douglas could develop a competing 
aircraft (the DC8 in 1958 as a follow-up of the DC7 of 1953) in a few years time, but the 
propeller aircraft remained the main competitor at the paradigmatic level. Only when 
Airbus in 1981 accepted the textbook of the Boeing model, a new paradigm for aircraft 
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development became increasingly dominant. Thus, it took more than 20 years to perform 
the transition; an entrenched paradigm exhibits resilience against change.  
 
Note that control at the regime level is no longer exerted at the level of individual 
corporations (such as Boeing) or individual nations, but by interacting dynamics at the 
next-order level of global developments of technologies and markets. Nation states with 
national aircraft industries may or may not be successful in retaining wealth from these 
developments. For example, Fokker in the Netherlands failed to make the necessary 
transition and remained hesitant about the paradigm choice after the transition had been 
made. It continued to develop both the propeller-based F50 and the jet-engine based F100 
and thus overstretched its capacity or that of the Dutch government and knowledge 
infrastructure.  
 
Increasingly, governments can be reflexive on their positions in the complex dynamics in 
which ex ante synchronization is no longer expected. As the evolutionary perspective 
prevails, a richer model in the form of the Triple Helix can be entertained, in which the 
specific position of a nation can be assessed in relation to other possible positions in a 
distribution of governmental efforts; for example, at the supra-national level (Laredo, 
2003). In other words, the selection environments can be considered as distributions 
which can be assessed in terms of the uncertainties that they are expected to contain.  
 
Empirical studies and simulations using the Triple Helix model 
We have argued that the Triple Helix perspective can be elaborated into a neo-
evolutionary model which enables us to recombine sociological notions of meaning 
processing in different discourses, economic theorizing about exchange relations, and 
insights from science and technology studies regarding the organization and control of 
knowledge production. Communicative competencies developed and appreciated at the 
supra-individual level can be expected to determine and constrain the innovative 
capacities of knowledge-based systems. Can the differently codified communications be 
translated into each other and can these translations be appreciated mutually? 
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Where the translations can resonate with the historically embedded (recursive) 
communication structures, the further codification of meaning in scientific knowledge 
production can be expected to add value to the economic exchange relations (Foray, 
2004; Frenken, 2005). Triple Helix serves us mainly as a heuristic model for modeling 
these interactions. Its abstract and analytical character enables us to explain current 
transitions towards a knowledge-based economy as a new regime of operations. In other 
words, this neo-evolutionary version of the Triple Helix model operationalizes the 
general notion of a knowledge-based economy as a self-organizing system (Krugman, 
1996) in terms of three relevant selection environments. 
 
The differentiation in terms of selection mechanisms can be both horizontal and vertical. 
Vertically, the flux of communications is constrained by the institutional arrangements 
that have been shaped in terms of stabilizations of previous communicative structures. 
Horizontally, the coordination mechanisms can be of a different nature because they can 
be expected to use different codes. For example, market transactions are different from 
scientific communications. Market transactions can also be cross-tabulated with 
organizational (control-) hierarchies (Williamson, 1975; Lundvall, 1988). While the 
control mechanisms at interfaces can be considered as functional for the differentiation 
among communications, the hierarchy in the organization may help reduce the problem 
of coordination between functions to a multi-level problem within the institutional 
dimension.   
 
In summary, the functional perspective is different from the institutional one. Functional 
communications evolve; institutional relations function as retention mechanisms which 
respond to functional incentives. However, the functions are not given, but have to be 
specified. Their epistemological status remains that of (more or less informed) 
hypotheses. Thus, one can study a Triple Helix system at different levels and from 
different perspectives. For example, one can study university-industry-government 
relations from a (neo-)institutional perspective (e.g., De Rosa Pires and De Castro, 1997; 
Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Gunasekara, 2006) or one can focus on the relations between 
university science and the economy in terms of communications (e.g., Langford et al., 
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1997). Different interpretations of the Triple Helix model can be at odds with each other, 
but still inform the model. Each metaphor stabilizes a geometrical representation of an 
otherwise more complex dynamics. 
 
Competing hypotheses derived from different versions of the Triple Helix model can be 
explored through formal modeling and appreciated through (neo-)institutional analysis. 
Case studies inform the modeling efforts about contingencies and boundary conditions, 
while simulation models enable us to relate the various perspectives. Such translations 
potentially reinforce the research process by raising new questions; for example, by 
comparing issues across different contexts and/or with reference to emerging phenomena. 
In the model, the three strands of the Triple Helix are declared as (formally equivalent) 
selection mechanisms, but they are substantially very different. The selection 
mechanisms are expected to operate asymmetrically.  
 
The one strand (university) is institutionally less powerful than the other two strands. 
Furthermore, the other two strands (government and industry) are increasingly and 
indirectly co-opting the university in a variety of ways. However, the university has 
specific strengths: it is salient in providing the other two systems with a continuous influx 
of new discursive knowledge (e.g., publications and patents) and new knowledge carriers 
(students). From this perspective, the university can be considered as a main carrier of the 
knowledge-based innovation system (Godin and Gingras, 2000). Knowledge-based fluxes 
continuously upset and reform the dynamic equilibria sought by the two other strands of 
the political economy.  
 
The Triple Helix and empirical studies 
In our opinion, the neo-evolutionary version of the Triple Helix model is sufficiently 
complex to encompass the different perspectives of participant observers (e.g., case 
histories) and to guide us heuristically in searching for options newly emerging from the 
interactions. What is the contribution of this model in terms of providing heuristics to 
empirical research?  
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First, the neo-institutional model of arrangements among different stakeholders can be 
used in case study analysis. Given the new mode of knowledge production, case studies 
can be enriched by addressing the relevance of the third major dimension of the model. 
This does not mean to disclaim the legitimacy of studying, for example, bi-lateral 
academic-industry relations or government-university policies, but one can expect more 
interesting results by observing reflexively the interactions among the three subdynamics. 
In other words, one can increase the relevance of a study by reflecting on how the third 
context may add to the richness of the conclusions. 
 
Secondly, the model can be informed by the increasing understanding of complex 
dynamics and simulation studies from evolutionary economics (e.g., Malerba et al., 1999; 
Windrum, 1999). Thirdly, the Triple Helix model adds to the meta-biological models of 
evolutionary economics, the sociological notion of meaning being exchanged among the 
institutional agents (Habermas, 1987; Leydesdorff, 2010; Luhmann, [1984] 1995).  
 
Finally, on the normative side of developing options for innovation policies, the Triple 
Helix model provides us with an incentive to search for mismatches between the 
institutional dimensions in the arrangements and the (hypothesized!) social functions 
carried by these arrangements. The frictions between the two layers (knowledge-based 
expectations and institutional interests), and among the three domains (economy, science, 
and policy) provide a wealth of opportunities for puzzle solving and innovation.  
 
The evolutionary regimes are expected to remain in transition because they are shaped 
along historical trajectories. Shifts in a knowledge-based regime can be expected 
continuously to upset the political economy and the market equilibria as different 
subdynamics. Conflicts of interest can be deconstructed and reconstructed in terms of 
these different coordination mechanisms, first analytically and then perhaps also in 
practice in the search for solutions to problems of economic productivity, wealth 
retention, and knowledge growth.  
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Salient features of this special issue 
The Triple Helix model has been embraced by policy-makers because of its neo-
corporatist overtones and its emphasis on collaboration at local, regional, and national 
levels. Unlike the a priori choice for the national level, the Triple Helix model can be 
appreciated at various levels of geographical integration. The self-organizing model of 
the Triple Helix, however, does not privilege any perspective ex ante. The knowledge 
dynamics tends to globalize and thus to uncouple from institutional conditions 
(Leydesdorff & Fritsch, 2006).  
 
Grasping wealth from retaining these dynamics requires a more informed and reflexive 
approach. Nationally and regionally motivated aspirations may, however, be 
counterproductive to a knowledge-based dynamics in metropolitan areas (Florida, 2002). 
For example, the structure of different regions in Spain, such as Catalonia or the Basque 
country, can be expected to require different innovation policies. Whereas Catalonia 
claims (sub)national integration at the level of this region for political reasons, the system 
may be integrated nationally and internationally more than envisaged locally (Riba-
Villanova & Leydesdorff, 2001). The Basque country, on the other hand, which is 
hitherto less integrated in the knowledge dynamics, may find it easier to develop a 
regional innovation system (Moso and Olazaran, 2002).  
 
Whereas the national and regional innovation systems would seek to retain the benefits of 
globalizing knowledge within specified geographical boundaries, the Triple Helix model 
underpins the study of innovation systems at various levels in terms of institutional and 
functional categories. It can thus be argued that the Triple Helix perspective has enriched 
the conceptual and empirical dimensions of innovation as a systemic phenomenon, thus 
potentially improving the effectiveness of innovation policies at regional and national 
levels, and in a system where knowledge production is being increasingly globalised.  
 
As is apparent from the discussion in the foregoing of this paper, there is a wide range of 
issues of theoretical and empirical significance arising from the Triple Helix approach to 
the innovation system. It would, therefore, be overly ambitious for a special issue like 
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this to be comprehensive in its coverage of the major aspects of the Triple Helix 
perspective of innovation systems. Rather, the aim of the issue is to contribute to the 
ongoing discussion by shedding light on some key issues, making them more discernible; 
and teasing out issues of policy relevance  that could be promoted within the Triple Helix 
framework.  
 
The four papers included in this special issue have a common strand running through 
them—namely, the regional dimension of the Triple Helix innovation system. This 
common strand set in different contexts, shows the robustness of the Triple Helix model 
as a heuristic for empirically investigating the complex dynamics underlying the 
innovation process at regional level. Two of the papers—one by Helen Lawton-Smith 
and Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen, and the other by Carl-Otto Frykfors and Hakan Jonsson—
discuss Triple Helix as a facilitator for the emergence of industrial clusters as a basis for 
regional development, albeit from different perspectives.  
 
The first study entitled “Triple Helix and Regional Development: a perspective from 
Oxfordshire in the UK” attributes the concentration of biotechnology activities in the 
region to the way the three dimensions of the Triple Helix have interacted to determine 
the distinctiveness of the region in terms of the evolution of political economy, 
knowledge infrastructure, and technological trajectory. The emergence of dominant 
factors in this process have made Oxfordshire a favourable location for the development 
of the biotechnology cluster. While university, industry, and government are all important 
for the emergence of the biotech cluster in Oxfordshire, Lawton-Smith and Bagchi-Sen 
found the dominant factor that particularly underpinned the biotechnology capability of 
the region to be not the role played by Oxford University as a world centre for biomedical 
research, but the availability of skills and talents in science and technology in the region.  
 
Frykfors and Jonsson discuss in their study entitled “Reframing the Multilevel Triple 
Helix in a Regional Innovation System: a case of systemic foresight and regimes in 
renewal of Skåne’s food industry” the reconstruction of a relatively low-tech mature 
industry cluster. The authors highlight the importance of a multi-level approach to Triple 
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Helix policy to engage in systemic interaction all Triple Helix actors across the value 
chain, thus paving the way for the emergence of an overarching innovation community in 
the sector.  
 
A characteristic feature of low-tech mature industrial clusters is the prevalence, at various 
levels, of sectoral activities of differentiated social and technological cultures that have 
ossified over the period the sector has evolved with boundaries between activities that 
constrain interaction and collaboration between Triple Helix actors. In such cases, the 
development of Triple Helix networks can blur the boundaries between spheres of 
activities; diminish the asymmetry in the distribution of information and hence the 
transactions cost of interactions between actors in the sector; and facilitate the emergence 
of innovation communities and prospects for sustainable development in the sector.  
 
Thus, as Frykfors and Jonsson argue, the transformative effect of Triple Helix policy on 
regional economies is not exclusive to high-tech clusters as is often presumed, but has 
also a significant role in the development of regions with low-tech mature industry 
clusters incorporating heterogeneous activities, as in the case of the food cluster in the 
Skane region in Sweden. However, where vested interests prevail against cultural 
transformation, it is important that regional policy is designed in a multilevel Triple Helix 
framework, so that the challenge of such forces is countervailed at all levels of sectorial 
activities. 
 
It may be asked as to how application of the Triple Helix policy mechanism to regional 
industry clusters translates into knowledge-based innovation. In his contribution entitled 
“Regional Innovation Systems: Development Opportunities from the ‘Green Turn’,” 
Philip Cooke takes this issue on board on the basis of the literature of regional innovation 
system to which he has been and is a principal contributor. In a bid to explore the 
pathway for “green innovation,” he argues that Triple Helix interactions could be 
integrated into regional innovation systems to exploit the benefits of synergy arising from 
the “transverality” of inter-cluster knowledge flows. “Green innovation,” which would 
respond to the global challenges of climate change and resource waste and degradation, 
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could thrive where related clusters (as in the heterogeneous set of renewable energy 
cluster) provide opportunities or “platforms” for cross-fertilization of knowledge.    
 
Central to Cooke’s argument of regional innovation and regional development through 
cross-pollination of technology platforms is the concept of “related variety” deriving 
from evolutionary economic geography. Given platform industries as integrated regional 
clusters based on  “related variety” or “knowledge proximity” (as in the case of 
renewable clusters focused, for example, on wind turbines, solar thermal and 
photovoltaics, greening engineering, etc.), Triple Helix interactions between clusters 
would prompt the emergence of innovation at cluster interfaces, making the region the 
locus of specific categories of strategic innovations (as in the case of “green 
innovations”) that are capable of shifting technology paradigms.  
 
The principle underlying Cooke’s analysis of opportunities for the emergence of “green 
innovation” can also be seen, if in part, in the Lawton-Smith and Bagchi-Sen study on the 
biotechnology cluster in Oxfordshire. In both cases, essential differences in regional 
capabilities are recognized; but whereas Lawton-Smith and Bagchi-Sen empirically 
attribute the location of biotechnology cluster in Oxfordshire to the availability of skills 
and talents in science and technology and also, if secondarily, to the proximity of Oxford 
University, Cooke invokes the analytical conceptual framework of path dependency to 
explain the selection of “new combinations,” and hence the pace and direction of “green 
innovation,” based on existing capabilities.  
 
On the other hand, the Frykfors and Jonsson study on food cluster in the Skane region  
may have an interestingly unconventional implication for the path dependency argument, 
as its findings suggest that the pace and direction of innovation would be prompted not 
by existing conditions and capabilities, which are culturally restrictive of change, but by a 
positive policy initiative to promote multilevel Triple Helix interactions that would help 
diminish the role of existing vested in interests in social and technological relationships. 
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The final contribution to this special issue by Matthew Shapiro, Minho So, and Han Woo 
Park addresses issues relating to the evolution of inter-regional collaboration networks in 
South Korea, including changing trends in the devolution of innovative activities across 
the country. Using longitudinal data on scientific co-authorship among Korean 
researchers located in different regions, the authors show the pattern of the evolving 
innovation network across the different regions in the country in terms of network 
centrality, network density, and network fragmentation.  
 
The authors conclude from their empirical analysis that the density of scientific 
communication flows has deepened in terms of the inter-connectedness of networks, 
while the centrality of Seoul as the primary research hub has declined, and that network 
fragmentation is still in evidence to the extent that Seoul has not lost is traditional role as 
the research broker for the country. It is argued that network fragmentation would decline 
with the development of Triple Helix relations in the regions which would have the effect 
of raising Korea’s knowledge-based infrastructure, including inter alia R&D capabilities. 
This, however, remains a hypothesis that has yet to be put to the test in the context of 
South Korea. 
 
The methodology involving head counts of co-authored publications is reflective of the 
state of networks arising from a process (Triple Helix, national innovation systems or 
otherwise), but not of the process itself involving the dynamic Triple Helix interactions. 
Moreover, the robustness of the method would depend on the extent to which co-authored 
publications have directly or indirectly involved partners from all Triple Helix spheres. 
Frykfors and Jonsson would, on the other hand, use “cultural analysis” to capture the 
dynamics in the Triple Helix process including the different social and technological 
regimes that influence the behaviour of actors in the system. This involves an open search 
process which allows space for testing some new thoughts and approaches across 
different phases, including the mapping of key stakeholders; systemic meetings of Triple 
Helix communities to debate and shape the way forward in terms of selection of “new 
combinations”; and the development of governance to provide for strategic leadership of 
innovation and development programmes.  
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 The four articles recognize the need for more work to show how the trilateral relations in 
the Triple Helix system can be made to function on a sustainable basis, and point out, as 
Layton-Smith and Bagchi-Sen do, the role of factors like entrepreneurship and skilled 
labour as “catalysts and integrators within a regional Triple Helix system”. These authors 
note that “entrepreneurs… are neglected within the Triple Helix model which focuses on 
the system rather than on primary actors;” and that this would not make sense in as much 
as  a region’s ability to innovate is contingent on the individuals’ ability to innovate. 
They attribute this systemic neglect to the Triple Helix model being a top-down based 
innovation system, with the result that the entrepreneur is at best only implicitly 
accommodated in the model. Furthermore, the focus of the model on systems ignores the 
peculiarities of individual actors and treats them as typical players: “…there is no such 
thing as a typical university and certainly no typical way to become an ‘entrepreneurial 
university’. Both ideas are neglected in Triple Helix model.” 
 
In our opinion, the crucial question is which phenomena one wishes to explain in terms of 
which theories? While each innovation is unique, since emergent and perhaps worthy a 
thick description, the relevance of case studies for understanding the dynamics of 
innovation can only be specified if the model is specified in terms of expectations. The 
observations can inform the expectations and drive us discursively to reformulations. For 
example, while Nelson & Winter (1977 and 1982) first distinguished between market and 
non-market selection mechanisms (cf. Von Hippel, 1988), the interactions between and 
among three selection environments can be expected to generate a complex dynamics. 
Whereas at a too high level of abstraction all specific data can be made to fit such a 
complex model, empirical studies force us to be specific, for example, in explaining 
whether the trajectories can be considered as uniquely constructed advantages which 
cannot easily be imitated or as instantiations of an emerging abstract regime within which 
competition is in a different phase. The more sophisticated such a model, the better one 
may be able to specify what (and why?) one is able to learn from which case studies. 
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